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THE STONERIDGE DECISION AND 
SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY 
IN SECURITIES FRAUD 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Eileen P. Kelly* 
Alka Bramhandkar** 
Securities fraud class action suits increased 
substantially in the wake of the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, 
and a host of other corporations. On January 15, 2008, the 
Supreme Court handed down one of the most important 
securities fraud cases in decades in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC, v.Scientific-Atlanta, Inc1. The focus of the 
Stoneridge case was secondary actor scheme liability. 
Secondary actors are parties that engage in business 
relationships with a company. Such parties could include 
suppliers, investment banks, financial services, law firms and 
accounting firms. In Stoneridge, the question put before the 
Supreme Court was whether shareholders could bring a private 
suit against secondary actors in a securities fraud action. First, 
the facts of the case will be explained. Next background 
information on private causes of action is provided Then the 
decisions of the District Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme 
Court will be outlined. Finally, the implications of the 
Supreme Court's decision will be discussed. 
* Professor of Management, Ithaca College, School of 
Business, NY. 
**Associate Professor of Finance and International Business, 
Ithaca College, School of Business, NY. 
2009/The Stoneridge Decision/2 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Charter Communications (Charter) was founded in the 
year 1993. Its main products were cable television and analog 
video service. In 1998, Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen 
purchased the company for $4.5 billion. After acquiring several 
companies like Greater Media & Helicon Cable, Charter went 
public in the year 1999 raising $3.2 billion.2 
Charter's problems began soon after its initial public 
offering (IPO), which was one of the largest IPOs at that time. 
It entered into an agreement with Motorola and Scientific 
Atlanta (Suppliers) to buy cable boxes. As per the terms of the 
agreement, Charter negotiated a price which was 20% higher 
than the fair market prices for cable boxes. In return, the 
suppliers promised to pay back the premium as marketing 
expenses. 3 How Charter treated this transaction on its books 
was definitely non-routine and did not conform to the standard 
accounting principles. Charter recorded the premium "ad 
revenue" as revenue for the current year registering a 
significant growth rate in its sales. The added cost of the cable 
boxes was not shown as an operating expense but appeared as 
an increase in revenue flowing straight to its net income. 
Charter chose to spread the extra cost over the next several 
years leading to a mismatch between the timing of the revenue 
and the cost of generating that revenue. 
The major motivation behind this manipulation was to 
increase the stock price, which produced large gains for a small 
group of Charter executives. An objection by the company 
auditors was addressed by de-linking the cable box purchases 
from the ad revenue. The suppliers were aware of the 
accounting fraud but chose to remain quiet. They did not 
engage in any fraud as far their own books were concerned. In 
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the year 2001, a total of 850,000 boxes were purchased, adding 
$17 million to Charter's reported revenue. 4 
This simple accounting scheme coupled with incorrect 
and inflated subscriber count, kept Charter's stock price high 
through the year 2001. In 2003, however, 4 executives pleaded 
guilty to securities fraud. 
On April 15, 2003, Charter revised several items on its 
financial statements for the years 2000 & 2001. Items such as 
option compensation, corporate expense charge, and loss on 
derivatives were restated with absolutely no change in its 
income for the year. In terms of the balance sheet, major 
changes were made in total investment in cable properties on 
the assets side. On the liabilities side, large adjustments were 
made in other long term liabilities. For the year 2000, 
adjustments in revenue and other expenses actually resulted 
increasing its loss. On the balance sheet, several additional 
items (accounts receivables, cash equivalents on the assets side 
and accounts payable on the liabilities side) underwent 
revisions. The following section discusses the issue of private 
actions in security fraud suits. 
PRIVATE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTIONS 
The majority of private securities fraud claims are filed 
under Section 1 O(b) of the Exchange Act and its implementing 
regulation Rule 10b-5. Section lO(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits "manipulative" or "deceptive" 
acts. In particular, the section states that it is: 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in 
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connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 5 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
enacted Rule 1 Ob-5 to enforce Section 1 O(b ). The rule states it 
is unlawful: 
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security. 6 
On its face, the express language of Rule 1 Ob-5 is more 
expansive than the statutory language contained in Section 
1 O(b) and appears to encompass other types of misconduct. 
The statutory language of the Securities Exchange Act 
does not expressly provide for a private cause of action under 
Section 1 O(b ). Rather, the private cause of action for securities 
fraud is a judicial construct in which the Supreme Court found 
a right of private action implied in the statute and Rule 10b-5. 
In Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 7 the Supreme Court 
rejected a narrow interpretation of Section 1 O(b) limited solely 
to preserving the integrity of the securities markets, instead 
advocating a more expansive interpretation to effectuate the 
remedial purposes of the Act. The Court noted that: 
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Since there was a "sale" of a 
security and since fraud was used 
"in connection with" it, there is 
redress under 1 O(b ), whatever 
might be available as a remedy 
under state law ....... We agree that 
Congress by 1 O(b) did not seek to 
regulate transactions which 
constitute no more than internal 
corporate mismanagement. But 
we read 1 O(b) to mean that 
Congress meant to bar deceptive 
devices and contrivances in the 
purchase or sale of securities 
whether conducted m the 
organized markets or face to 
face."8 
The Supreme Court has noted that private actions under 
Section 1 O(b) are distinct from a common law deceit and 
misrepresentation claim. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that Rule 1 Ob-5 cannot be interpreted to impose 
liability beyond the express statutory language of Section 1 O(b) 
which prohibits only "manipulative" or "deceptive" conduct.9 
Generally speaking, a plaintiff states a private action for 
securities fraud, if the following are alleged and proved: 
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant, 
(2) scienter, i.e., knowledge of the wrongdoing, 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission 
and the purchase or sale of a security, 
( 4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, 
(5) economic loss, and 
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(6) loss causation, i.e. a causal connection between a 
material misrepresentation and loss. 10 
The implied private right of action for securities fraud 
clearly covers secondary actors who commit primary 
violations. The critical question before the courts in the 
Stoneridge case was whether the implied private right of action 
for security fraud under Section 1 O(b) extended to aiding and 
abetting by secondary actors. Should there be liability when 
the secondary actors did not engage in a securities transaction 
and did not make or participate in making a material 
misstatement or omission? 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
Stoneridge Investment Partners filed a securities fraud 
class action under Sec. lO(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
against Charter, its senior executives, Charter's auditor Arthur 
Andersen LLP, Scientific Atlanta and Motorola on behalf of 
investors who had purchased Charter Communications stock. 1 1 
Scientific Atlanta and Motorola were Charter's vendors, and 
later their customers, who supplied it with digital cable boxes. 
The plaintiffs contended that two of the secondary actors, 
Scientific Atlanta and Motorola, schemed with Charter 
Communications to defraud Charter's investors. 
The plaintiffs alleged that Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola were secondary actors who engaged in sham 
transactions for "advertising" with Charter in order to inflate 
Charter's operating cash flow and revenues to meet the 
analyst's expectations. The plaintiffs further contended that 
Scientific Atlanta and Motorola had clear knowledge that 
Charter was: 
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a. fraudulently accounting for their payments as revenues, 
b. fraudulently recording the payments Charter was 
making to them as capital expenses, 
c. fraudulently inflating its operating revenue and cash 
flow, 
d. fraudulently deceiving stock analysts who would rely 
on the inflated revenues and operating cash flow in 
making stock recommendations, and 
e. fraudulently deceiving investors m Charter 
Communications. 
The plaintiffs argued that by entering into these sham 
transactions with Charter, Scientific- Atlanta and Motorola 
knowingly or recklessly engaged in a scheme to defraud 
Charter's investors. More pointedly, they: 
a. violated Section lO(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) by making 
material and misrepresentations to Charter investors, 
and 
b. violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) by engaging in a scheme 
or artifice to defraud and by engaging in an acts which 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon Charter's investors. 
The District Court ruled in favor of the two defendants 
and dismissed the complaint against them. The Court held that 
while Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta aided and abetted 
Charter's fraud, those actions did not violate Section lO{b) and 
Rule lOb-5. In doing so, the Court relied on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, NA. 12 In Central Bank, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Section 1 O(b) prohibits only 
"manipulative or deceptive" devices or contrivances. The 
Supreme Court noted "that the statute prohibits only the 
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the 
commission of a manipulative act...The proscription does not 
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include giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or 
deceptive act." 13 In reviewing the statutory language and 
legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to 
impose secondary liability for aiding and abetting. 
Because the text of§ 1 O(b) does not prohibit aiding and 
abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not 
maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 1 O(b ). The 
absence of § 1 O(b) aiding and abetting liability does not 
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are 
always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any 
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or 
bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a 
material misstatement (or omission) on which a 
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a 
primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the 
requirements for primary liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 are 
met.J4 
In the seminal Central Bank decision, the Supreme 
Court held that there was no civil secondary liability under 
Section 1 O(b) for aiding and abetting. The Court stated that 
extending such liability to secondary actors would not serve the 
objectives of the statute and might in fact impair the efficiency 
in the securities markets. 
The District Court stressed that the plaintiffs' never 
asserted that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola ever made 
fraudulent statements themselves or were involved in the 
preparation of Charters misleading financial statements. 
Instead, plaintiffs contend that Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola are liable to Charter's investors on the basis 
that they engaged in a business transaction that Charter 
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purportedly improperly accounted for ..... The Court can 
find no precedent for the conclusion that business 
partners, such as Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta, made 
false and misleading statements by virtue of engaging 
in a business enterprise with a company such as 
Charter, the entity purported to have made the 
"d. 15 statement sa1 Issue. 
The District Court went on to reject the plaintiffs 
argument that In re Enron Corp. Sec. , Derivative & ERISA 
Litig., 16 was controlling. In the Enron case, the plaintiffs 
argued that the secondary actors, mainly Enron's lawyers, 
accountants, and underwriters, participated in a Ponzi scheme, 
which led to fraudulent financial statements. The Enron court 
held several secondary actors liable for securities fraud. The 
District Court noted that: 
This Court does not find Enron on point. To reiterate, 
Enron held that § 1 O(b) liability may only be imposed 
for secondary actors who have created a document 
containing a misrepresentation upon which investors 
relied. The Amended Complaint does not allege that 
Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola created or participated in 
the creation of any of Charter's accounting, financial 
statements, public filings or public statements, nor does 
it allege that they directed, or even knew of, Charter's 
accounting treatment. The plaintiffs also do not allege 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola made public 
representations about Charter or that any Charter 
investor relied on anything Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola said. The Court concludes that plaintiffs' 
claim fails as neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola 
made a representation to Charter's investors nor 
participated in the drafting of statements Charter made 
to its investors. 17 
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THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
On Stoneridge's appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's ruling. 18 The plaintiffs stressed that the lower 
court had erred, and that they indeed had properly alleged a 
primary violation of the securities laws. Employing a narrow 
interpretation of Central Bank, the plaintiffs argued that 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 
by participating in a "scheme or artifice to defraud" and by 
engaging in a course of business, which operates as a fraud or 
deceit. The plaintiffs relied heavily on the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York decision, 
In re Parma/at Sec. Litig.19 In Parma/at, the Southern District 
concluded that Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) read together are broadly 
worded and therefore don't require the proof of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation or failure to disclose that Rule 1 Ob-5(b) 
does. 
The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs interpretation 
of Central Bank and reiterated that a private party may not 
bring a 1 Ob-5 suit for acts not prohibited under Section 1 O(b ). 
The Court concluded that the basis of the plaintiffs' claims was 
deception, and therefore was barred under Central Bank. The 
Court noted the danger of allowing such suits. 
To impose liability for securities fraud on one party to 
an arm's length business transaction in goods or 
services other than securities because that party knew or 
should have known that the other party would use the 
transaction to mislead investors in its stock would 
introduce potentially far-reaching duties and 
uncertainties for those engaged in day-to-day business 
dealings .20 
11Nol.21/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola's engagement in the 
sham transactions with Charter at best amounted to aiding and 
abetting since the latter companies had neither made false or 
misleading statements, nor had they been responsible for the 
content of Charter's financial statements. Their actions were 
not relied upon by the public. The Eighth Circuit commented 
that any expansion of secondary liability would ultimately rest 
with Congress, for it was their responsibility to change the 
securities laws. In fact, the Court pointed out that Congress had 
done the opposite. In Section 104 of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Congress directed the 
SEC to prosecute aiders and abettors but did not create thereby 
a private cause of action.21 The PSLRA in fact requires the 
private plaintiff to "state 'with particularity' facts giving rise to 
a 'strong inference ' that the defendant acted with the scienter 
required for the primary actor cause of action."22 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Split in the Circuits 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in large part 
because of the split in the circuits, particularly by the Eighth 
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, over the issue of scheme liability 
for secondary actors. Scheme liability refers to secondary 
actors aiding and abetting in a fraudulent scheme that does not 
involve a misstatement, omission or manipulation in security 
transactions. The split over this issue was evident even within 
the Bush administration. The SEC supported the private 
plaintiffs, while the Treasury Department supported the 
defendants. Notably, the White House denied the SEC the 
authority to file an amicus brief, while it directed the Justice 
Department to argue against allowing shareholders suits. 
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As noted above, the Eighth Circuit in Stoneridge 
strongly rejected secondary liability for aiding and abetting as 
outside the scope of the statutory language of Section 1 O(b ). In 
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc./3 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals essentially endorsed scheme liability making 
secondary actors liable for participating in a fraudulent scheme 
for actions other than material misstatement, omission or 
manipulation. The Supreme Court reasoned that such conduct 
was "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 10(b) and 
thereby actionable. But the Court noted that: 
Participation in a fraudulent transaction by itself, 
however, is insufficient to qualify the defendant as a 
"primary violator" if the deceptive nature of the 
transaction or scheme was not an intended result, at 
least in part, of the defendant's own conduct. We hold 
that to be liable as a primary violator of § 1 O(b) for 
participation in a "scheme to defraud," the defendant 
must have engaged in conduct that had the principal 
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact 
in furtherance of the scheme. It is not enough that a 
transaction in which a defendant was involved had a 
deceptive purpose and effect; the defendant's own 
conduct contributing to the transaction or overall 
scheme must have had a deceptive purpose and effect.24 
It was against this backdrop of controversy, that the 
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Stoneridge. On 
January 15, 2008, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision.25 The Court reaffirmed 
its previous position in Central Bank that Section 1 O(b) 
liability did not extend to secondary actors who aided and 
abetted a "scheme to defraud." 
Reliance on Deceptive Actions 
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The Supreme Court pointed out that Scientific-Atlanta 
and Motorola's engagement in sham transactions which inflated 
Charter's operating revenues and cash flows took place in the 
marketplace for goods and services rather than in the 
investment sphere. The Court reasoned that Scientific-Atlanta 
and Motorola did not have a duty to disclose Charter's or their 
own alleged deceptive acts. Their actions were never 
communicated to the public and were too remote in the chain 
of fraud for investors to have relied on them. Reliance on 
deceptive acts is a critical element in bringing a private cause 
of action for securities fraud under Section 1 O(b ). The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were unable to meet that 
burden ofproof.26 
Scheme Liability 
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs argument of 
scheme liability. The Court noted that the plaintiffs position 
would require potential private liability to be applied to the 
entire marketplace. The court found this untenable and 
stressed the need for the federal courts to guard against 
expansion by judicial interpretation. 
The petitioner invokes the private cause of action under 
§ 1 O(b) and seeks to apply it beyond the securities 
markets-the realm of financing business-to purchase 
and supply contracts-the realm of ordinary business 
operations. The latter realm is governed, for the most 
part, by state law. It is true that ifbusiness operations 
are used, as alleged here, to affect securities markets, 
the SEC enforcement power may reach the culpable 
actors. It is true as well that a dynamic, free economy 
presupposes a high degree of integrity in all of its parts, 
an integrity that must be underwritten by rules 
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enforceable in fair, independent, accessible courts. 
Were the implied cause of action to be extended to the 
practices described here, however, there would be a risk 
that the federal power would be used to invite litigation 
beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and 
in areas already governed by functioning and effective 
state-law guarantees.27 
The Supreme Court underscored that the petitioner's 
position would contravene Congress's specific response to 
Central Bank in Section 104 of the PSLRA. As noted 
previously, Section 104 expressly authorizes the SEC to bring 
actions for aiding and abetting, not private parties. 
The determination of who can seek a remedy has 
significant consequences for the reach of federal 
power. . .. Concerns with the judicial creation of a 
private cause of action caution against its expansion. 
The decision to extend the cause of action is for 
Congress, not for us. 28 
Other Remedies Available 
The Court pointed out in Stoneridge that that secondary 
actors can still be found primarily liable. "All secondary actors, 
furthermore, are not necessarily immune from private suit. The 
securities statutes provide an express right of action against 
accountants and underwriters in certain circumstances and 
implied right of action in 1 O(b) continues to cover secondary 
actors who commit primary violations."29 
However, the Court noted that other remedies are 
nonetheless available against secondary actors. Criminal 
penalties and civil enforcement by the SEC are key 
enforcement tools. The Court noted that since 2002, the SEC 
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collected over 1 0 billion in disgorgement and penalties. 
Enforcement tools also exist at the state level with state 
securities laws. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that when 
the secondary actors indeed have primary liability, remedies 
already exist. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STONERIDGE DECISION 
The importance of the Stoneridge case for the future of 
private securities litigation is enormous. The Stoneridge 
decision was clearly a cause for celebration on Wall Street and 
dismay for stockholders. The New York Times characterized 
the decision as placing "a towering obstacle in the path of 
shareholders looking for someone to sue when a stock purchase 
turned sour. "30 
The Stoneridge decision sharply limited the ability of 
shareholders who are defrauded by a company to sue other 
parties. This is particularly poignant when the company in 
question is bankrupt like Enron. Secondary actors, such as 
investment bankers, vendors, and accountants, breathed a sigh 
of relief with the Supreme Court's stipulation that shareholders 
must rely directly on secondary actor's statements for liability 
to accrue. In order to be held accountable under Section 1 O(b) 
in private actions, the secondary actor's actions must satisfy 
each of the elements under that section for primary liability.31 
As a practical matter, since the majority of secondary actors 
have little reason to speak to the public about their transactions 
and have no duty to do so, there is little likelihood that they 
will. In light of this, satisfying the elements of primary liability 
will be excruciatingly difficult. The Stoneridge decision was a 
clear loss for those who believed in scheme liability in 
securities fraud. Clearly, this decision has implications in the 
ever escalating subprime mortgage litigation. 32 
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The implications of the Stoneridge decision for the $40 
billion class action lawsuit filed by Enron shareholders against 
the investment banks that advised Enron - Merrill Lynch & 
Co., Credit Suisse Group, Barclays PLC and Pershing LLC-
was almost immediate. 33 One of the more infamous frauds that 
secondary actors engaged in with Enron was the notorious 
Nigerian barge deal that Enron and Merrill Lynch entered into. 
A week after the Supreme Court handed down the Stoneridge 
decision, it denied certiorari in the Enron impliedly ruling that 
the Stoneridge decision has sounded the death knell for 
secondary actor scheme liability?4 Whether the Stoneridge 
decision will be counterproductive in the long run remains to 
be seen. 
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